The November 27, 2025 by-elections were expected to be routine contests in 22 electoral areas across Kenya. On the surface, polling appeared orderly: most stations opened on time, voting and counting were conducted transparently, and KIEMS kits largely functioned correctly. Yet civil-society observers, led by the Elections Observation Group (ELOG) and supported by the Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU) and Vocal Africa, warned that the elections were far from free and fair. Their reports painted a landscape marred by intimidation, bribery, misuse of state resources, secrecy breaches, and pockets of violence.
In constituencies flagged by observers — including Kasipul, Malava, Mbeere North, Kariobangi North, and parts of Machakos — voters faced harassment and threats, sometimes orchestrated through armed groups operating with the knowledge of local security personnel.
In Kariobangi North, an ELOG team reported being blocked by a crowd demanding money before allowing observation to continue, a striking example of the pressure applied even to independent monitors. These conditions were not random; in each flagged constituency, the winning candidates belonged to the historically dominant local parties, suggesting that malpractice reinforced existing political advantages rather than creating surprise upsets.
State Resources, Incumbency Advantage
Observers also documented widespread voter inducement. Cash envelopes, blankets, food parcels, and other relief items were distributed in multiple constituencies, often with instructions to show proof of compliance, such as photographing ballots. This practice, combined with 15.2 percent of polling stations experiencing ballot-secrecy violations, created a system where voters’ choices were influenced through both incentive and fear, translating into measurable advantage for well-resourced candidates and party machines.
State resources further amplified incumbency advantage. Public officials, including senior administrators and security personnel, openly participated in political campaigns. County vehicles, government facilities, and development project launches coincided with campaign periods, providing candidates with visibility and implied endorsement.
In Baringo County, for example, a fiber-optic project launch during the campaign window drew media attention and suggested government backing for favored candidates. The line between state functions and partisan politics blurred, reinforcing advantages for entrenched actors.
The mechanics of voting were compromised beyond inducement and intimidation. Unauthorized “super agents” gained access to polling stations, often with the tacit consent of presiding officers. Assisted voting procedures were routinely violated, particularly affecting elderly, disabled, or illiterate voters, undermining both secrecy and autonomy. Organised breaches, such as photographing ballots for proof of compliance, highlight a coordinated effort to monitor and influence the vote.
Digital manipulation compounded these challenges. Observers noted a surge in fake opinion polls, forged documents, and manipulated videos, predominantly on WhatsApp, Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram. Approximately 36 percent of the disinformation targeted the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), creating confusion and demobilisation among voters. In combination with physical coercion and material inducement, this created a multi-layered system of advantage for organised political actors.
Cross-referencing IEBC official results with ELOG and IMLU observations reveals a clear pattern: major winners were concentrated in UDA and ODM strongholds, often overlapping with constituencies flagged for violence, bribery, or misuse of state resources.
Kasipul returned an ODM candidate, Malava a UDA winner, Mbeere North its dominant party representative, Kariobangi North a ruling coalition-backed candidate, and Machakos County retained a local strongman aligned with governing party networks. This convergence of party machinery, state advantage, and systematic malpractice ensured predictable outcomes, consolidating regional power bases.
The malpractices observed created a mechanism that translated misconduct into electoral success: pre-election inducement encouraged voter compliance; state resource mobilisation amplified visibility and credibility; intimidation suppressed opposition turnout; and misinformation campaigns misdirected or demobilised voters. Together, these elements allowed well-organised candidates and parties to secure the greatest gains.
Civil Society Response
Civil society has responded decisively. Vocal Africa, led by CEO Hussein Khalid, and allied organisations have called for investigations and accountability, highlighting the erosion of democratic norms. Their demands include strict enforcement of ballot secrecy, investigation of bribery and intimidation, accountability for misuse of state resources, protection of observers and voters, and intensified civic education to safeguard the integrity of future elections.
The November 27 by-elections demonstrate that orderly polling alone cannot guarantee a free and fair outcome. Material inducement, intimidation, misuse of state machinery, and information manipulation create a system in which electoral advantage is engineered and predictable.
If left unaddressed, these patterns risk normalisation ahead of the 2027 general elections, threatening the credibility of national democracy. The challenge now lies in ensuring that civil-society warnings lead to meaningful reform, accountability, and the preservation of voters’ rights before the next major political contest.
